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INDUSTRIALISATION IN THE PERIPHERY:
SOUTHERN RHODESIAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN
TRADE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE WARS
The aim and policy of the ... Government have
been to do nothing to affect the cost of living
(Minister of Finance and Commerce, 19 April 1937)
Over the last two decades the process of industrialisation
in Africa has generated considerable scholarly interest and debate.
While much of the interest flows from industry's acknowledged potential
as 'the main lever of African development',1 most of the debate
concerns the reasons for its generally poor performance. Broadly
speaking, opinion is divided between those writers who emphasize
the 'major external constraints limiting industrialization', and others
who analyse industrialisation in terms of 'internal forces /which7
help or hinder it'.^ To date, these issues have been most exhaustively
explored in the 'Kenya Debate1.3 By comparison, analysis of Zimbabwe's
much larger industrial sector has lagged far behind. Although
developments since 1965, particularly the role. and significance of
foreign capital, have been studied,^ neither the origins nor the nature
of Zimbabwean industrialisation have received much attention.^ in
seeking to open these topics for discussion, this paper argues that
the growth of local secondary industry was crucially conditioned
by the interwar pattern of Southern Rhodesia's trade relations with
South Africa. -
I
Although secondary industry in Southern Rhodesia only expanded
substantially once imperialism was convulsed by crisis during the
Depression and the Second World War, its roots stretched back to
the 1890s and the First World War. During a short-lived mining boom
between 1894 and early 1896 several foundry and engineering concerns,
among them Cunninghams of Salisbury and Issels and Son of Bulawayo,
were established. They concentrated on repair work for the mining
industry but in some cases developed an iron and brass castings capacity
in order to manufacture mine cyanide and water storage tanks. In
addition Issels made and mended wagons.6 However the frequently
fraudulent and speculative character of goldmining enterprise before
the turn of the century determined that this market was small and
unpredictable. As a result the number of light engineering firms
hardly changed until reconstruction established the mining industry's
viability. What little evidence there is indicates that these concerns
were family ventures or partnerships.' Large-scale British and South
African interests were content to leave such limited and uncertain
pickings to local capital.
The growth of other secondary industries was only slightly
less stunted. Consumer demand generated by Bulawayo and Salisbury's
(Harare) slowly increasing populations was satisfied by coastal merchant
houses, while the nearest export markets were hundreds, generally
thousands, of miles away. Pioneer processing and packaging industries
were consequently those who turned Southern Rhodesia's remoteness
to advantage. Imports with high bulk to value ratios and whose prices
were inflated by the cost of absorbing transport charges were the
first to be challenged by local products. A brewery was started in
Salisbury in 1899, but the highly lucrative business of slaking settler
thirsts was soon swallowed up by outside capital. In 1910 it was taken
over by South African Breweries Ltd.** Tobacco processing also
attracted entrepreneurial interest. Visiting directors of the Chartered
Company were petitioned in 1907 for special railway rates 'to encourage
local industry ... As an example we would instance machinery for
the manufacture of tobacco and cigarette tins and packing and raw
material for their manufacture'. Over the next few years small
factories sprang up in Bulawayo and Umtali (Mutare), from where
it was reported that the 'Manufacture of Egyptian cigarettes from
imported tobacco is carried on with considerable success: on an average
10,000 cigarettes are turned out each week and a ready market found
for them throughout Rhodesia'.^ And following the expansion of
capitalist agriculture in the first decade of this century creameries
were established in Bulawayo and Gwelo (Gweru) in 1909 and 1913
respectively. H
When war broke out in Europe in 1914 the destruction of various
international trading relationships and the interruption of others
initiated a period of unprecedented opportunity for southern African
secondary industries. Freed from overseas competition, they had
domestic and regional markets largely to themselves. So far as
Southern Rhodesia was concerned, however, this often meant that
British and other European goods were replaced by South African
imports, as her own tiny industrial base could not expand far or fast.
enough to meet more than a fraction of market demands. But although
large areas of the domestic market were beyond their immediate
reach, local industrialists nonetheless broadened the scope of their
activities. Between 1915 and 1918 fertiliser, bacon and vegetable
oil factories began production. Maize grinding mills were built in
Salisbury and Gwelo, saw mills were started and cattle dipping fluid
was manufactured. 12 At the same time, foundry work became
increasingly important as 'a great many of the orders in this connection,
which in former years have been sent to the Rand are now being
executed in Salisbury'.13 Nor did import-substitution stop with the
end of the war. Inflation in Europe, limited shipping space and the
short supply of manufactured articles all combined to protect local
industry in the immediate postwar period. The early 1920s witnessed
continued industrial growth despite economic recession in 1921-2.
New enterprises established in Salisbury alone included a leather
works, another bacon factory and several biscuit factories. By 1922
the Colony could also produce breakfast cereals, soaps, candles and
furniture.*4
But with the return of 'normal1 trading" conditions to the
capitalist world market, foreign competition once again intensified.
Industrial expansion in the seond half of the decade was generally
slow and uneven. For some Southern Rhodesian workshops the impact
of competition was offset by increased demand due to the accelerating
rate of proletarianisation and the greater monetisation of the African
rural economy. More important still were new markets created by
the development of the Copperbelt in Katanga (Shaba) and especially
Northern Rhodesia (Zambia).** Household utensils 'of every description'
were manufactured for domestic consumption and 'windmills, pumps,
pipes, steel tobacco flues, boilers, ... sands and slimes plants, smoke
stacks, steel ladders, twist drills and fan blowers' were made for
Central African farms and mines. ^  Such experiences were
exceptional, however. Most local industries typically struggled to
make ends meet as the process of import-substitution ran up against
barriers fixed by international competition and reinforced by consumer
resistance to local products. *?
Although manufacturing contributed about 13 percent of
Southern Rhodesia's estimated £12 million gross national income
in I926,18 industrialists realised that further progress depended on
tariff protection of the kind enjoyed by their counterparts in South
Africa. 'The Union Government have, for a number of years,
encouraged secondary industries in every shape and form', declared
the Rhodesia Manufacturers' Association, 'and we in this country
... have not a chance unless we are similarly protected'. 19
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Up until that point Southern Rhodesian tariff policy had been
strongly opposed to protection of any sort. It was designed to raise
revenue and promote the export of primary products. As Britain
and South Africa were by far her most important trading partners,
these principles were embodied In successive customs agreements
negotiated with the Cape Colony in 1899 and with South Africa after
1910. While both countries agreed to the free interchange of their
products under the umbrella of the South Africa tariff, Southern
Rhodesia reserved the right 'to suspend the duties upon certain
necessaries, and to grant greater preference to British goods under
the clause of the ll&9§J Order-in-Council, generally known as the
"Rhodes Clause"'.2O AS compensation for customs duty surrendered
under South African tariff regulations, Southern Rhodesia received
a commuted payment from the Union Government. By 1920 this
amounted to £125 000 p.a.21 Because of the Rhodes Clause it was
less than Southern Rhodesia would otherwise have received, but her
attachment to the cause of imperial preference was unshakeable.
It reaffirmed settler loyalty to the British Empire and symbolised
autonomy in relation to South Africa. And by keeping the cost of
living down, empire preference helped primary producers.
In one form or another this trading arrangement endured for over
20 years. After 1918, however, points of friction multiplied and in
December 1922 South Africa gave notice of its impending withdrawal
from the customs agreement then in operation. The main reason
for South African discomfort with the existing situation was the rapid
growth of Southern Rhodesian agriculture since the war. Under
pressure from farmers threatened with bankruptcy by the free entry
of Rhodesian cattle and tobacco exports, the South African government
embargoed Southern Rhodesian cattle weighing less than 800 lbs.
This action, taken shortly before the start of negotiations in 1924
for a new customs agreement, was the first of several such steps.
At the conference itself South Africa wanted to raise the weight
limit to 1200 lbs. When the horrified Southern Rhodesian delegation
protested that this would have the practical effect of keeping out
all their cattle,22 the South African representatives grudgingly lowered
the embargo level to 1050 lbs. They insisted, though, on excluding
the lower grades of Rhodesian tobacco from South Africa's markets,
even as they pressed Southern Rhodesia to import South African
manufactured articles at the lowest rate of duty. Convinced that
the Colony's 'present condition'2^ precluded protection from serious
consideration and relieved that South African markets had not been
completely closed, the Southern Rhodesian Government unhesitatingly
sacrificed the interests of its own industrialists on the altar of
principled expediency. 'The only alternative', privately concluded
the Colony's Treasurer, 'was to break away altogether and the effect
of that would have been an absolute embargo, less favourable railway
rates (a matter of importance in the export of cattle and meat), a
hostile neighbour, and some increase in the cost of living1.24
In making the best of a bad agreement, Rhodesian policy-makers
all assumed that southern Africa would continue to export primary
products and import manufactured goods much as before. They took
it for granted that South Africa's customs tariff would be used in
the old way to raise revenue and facilitate trade between adjacent
colonies and with Britain. Neither assumption survived for very long.
In 1925 the South African Government passed a Tariff Act
which served notice of its determination to transform South Africa's
dependent role in the world economy by fostering the development
of secondary industry.2^ Because the Act encouraged 'the use of
South African primary products in the production of manufactured
goods', it 'implicitly placed ... South African producers ... at odds
^with7 suppliers in the surrounding territories',2^ thereby
undercutting what was left of regional free trade. The Tariff Act
also had a negative impact on Southern Rhodesian customs revenue.
As South Africa reduced tariffs on materials imported for use in
her secondary industries, so more and more goods qualified for entry
into Southern Rhodesia on payment of the lowest rate of duty. Local
merchants were particularly disturbed by 'alterations in the Union
tariff ... to a point below duties payable in this country by direct
importers', as goods 'sent up from the Union ... /could7 complete
with goods imported direct into this country from overseas'.27 Their
xenophobic customers who compensated for 'driving American motor
cars by putting a little British Union Jack on top of the radiator'28
were even more upset when the trade pact signed between South
Africa and Germany in 1928 opened up the prospect of German imports
entering Southern Rhodesia 'on the same terms, or possibly better
terms, than British goods',29 South African policy, so the Legislative
Assembly was told, 'is inimical to the interests of the people of this
Colony, whether they were producers, traders, consumers, or the
Treasury itself'.30
All of these reasons persuaded the Southern Rhodesian
Government that a new agreement would have to be negotiated with
South Africa. But when the two sides met in Pretoria in September
1929, the Southern Rhodesians found that by re-opening the tariff
question they had presented South Africa with an opportunity to raise
its demands not lower them. Moffat's negotiators were bluntly told
that South Africa intended to halve the existing market for Rhodesian
tobacco by imposing an import quota of 2 400 000 lbs. p.a. They
were further informed that South Africa insisted on the free entry
of the greater part of its own agricultural produce and manufactured
goods into Southern Rhodesia. Rhodesian counter-proposals were
brushed aside and the conference collapsed. 'Having taken away
half of our tobacco market', complained the Southern Rhodesian
Minister of Finance, South Africa acted as if 'we should make
compensation to them for what was left to us ... It was like two
men who had a difference, and the bigger man gave the smaller man
a hiding, and said, "I might have given you a bigger hiding, but, not
having done it, you can give me some compensation"'.^
The breakdown of negotiations with South Africa presented
local industrialists with an unprecedented opportunity. 'Rhodesians
are not in the least dismayed1, declared the Premier. 'We are prepared
to carry on' without the least fear or hesitation in the future under
the altered circumstances'.3* And prominent amongst the changed
circumstances was the possibility of protection for Southern Rhodesian
secondary industries. Speculation that this was in the offing reached
fever-pitch when the Treasurer publicly announced that the
Government had received 'enquiries from several manufacturers in
the Union with the idea of opening up branches in this country. We
hope that will be one of the beneficial results of this separation:
that factories will start ... {here]t and they will have the benefit
of protection, whatever protection is needed, of the duties payable
on South African manufactures'. 'That must help to create a larger
market and widen the scope of employment, and there will be other
benefits', he added,33
But the business community barely had time to savour the
implications of the Government's volte face before the state turned
about again. The Northern Rhodesian Administration which had
previously stood firm with Southern Rhodesia against South Africa
suddenly broke ranks and resumed contact with Pretoria. Close
economic ties with South Africa were considered essential for the
Copperbelt as it fought its way onto the world market.34 Alarmed
at the prospect of the 'Union offering very substantial preferences
to the people in the north in order ... to capture the trade which has
been carried on by this country',3^ and chastened by Wall Street's
recent collapse, Southern Rhodesia reopened talks with her powerful
southern neighbour in January 1930. With South Africa holding virtually
every important card, the negotiations were speedily concluded. Most
South African manufactured articles were allowed across the Limpopo
subject only to a six percent payment in lieu of duty. By contrast
the southwards movement of Rhodesian cattle and tobacco was severely
restricted. All that Southern Rhodesia managed to salvage was the
right to frame its own tariffs, thereby securing a greater degree
of control over imports.3" 'I consider that it /the Agreement7 is
a measure of expediency on account of the world slump', commented
Godfrey Huggins. 'It is an agreement which ... can be terminated
at the right moment. That right moment will be when cause is given
us and we have put our house in order and arranged for other outlets
for our primary products'.3'
mSome members of the Southern Rhodesian Legislative Assembly
found it hard to wait that long. In November 1931 they called for
the termination of the Customs Agreement on the grounds that the
'one thing late events /the Depression/ have demonstrated is that
it is essential in any country, if it is going to provide for its population,
that the natural resources of the country should, where feasible,
be turned into a manufactured state ... Z^nd7 so long as the agreement
subsists between ourselves and the Union of South Africa, that is
not possible in Rhodesia'.38 But however much the Depression
emphasised the extreme vulnerability of primary producers to adverse
shifts in world demand, this was more than counterbalanced by the
boost which it gave to the Colony's gold mining industry. The
counter-cyclical advance of gold enormously strengthened Free Trade
interests opposed to protective tariff measures which might raise
production costs. Nor did commerce have any reason to embrace
Protection, while capitalist agriculture was positively hostile towards
the idea. Reeling under successive blows delivered by the tobacco
debacle of 1928 and the Great Depression, organised agriculture clung
desperately to what was left of its South African market. A
commission of enquiry into the working of the Customs Agreement
accordingly advised against its termination.™
Southern Rhodesian manufacturers were anyway enjoying a
period of remarkable growth. Between 1932 and 1938 the value added
of secondary, industries increased threefold, while the sector's annual
rate of expansion over the whole period 1929-38 was 7.5 percent,
even higher than mining at 7.2 percent.40 This phenomenon was
mostly due to the buoyancy of the internal market supported by gold
mines. It also owed much to the quickened pace of African
proletarianisation and commodity production during the 1930s. To
some extent as well it rested on a process of import-substitution.
When the British pound was devalued in 1931, South Africa decline
to follow suit. As a result her currency appreciated against sterling.
South African exports became more expensive and less competitive.
North of the Limpopo this meant that 'Union exports ... are in effect
subjected to a disability or tax of 20%'.4^ Protection of such magnitude
had wide-ranging consequences. Local industrialists rushed to take
advantage of the new situation, even as it also compelled several
South African companies to establish subsidiaries in Southern
Rhodesia.42 At the same time industry's identity and agenda was
systematically distinguished from that of commerce. Manufacturing's
distinctive interests were championed in the pages of New Rhodesia
where it was argued that Southern Rhodesia's past development had
'been conditioned entirely by our economic subservience ... to the
outer world ... Now a great change is upon us. Not we ourselves,
but world conditions, have broken that tutelage'.43 Manufactured
exports to Northern Rhodesia picked up, and by 1933 Southern
Rhodesian factories made
butter and cheese, maize meal and wheaten flour, soap and
candles, bacon and hams, squashes and minerals (soft drinksj,
sweets, paints, malt liquors, tobacco, cement and tiles. Smaller
industries produce^!/ furniture, stationery, biscuits, clothing
for the native trade, fertilisers, jams, polishes e tc . 4 4
The breathing-space fortuitously accorded Southern Rhodesian
secondary industry by South Africa's prickly national pride lasted
for little more than a year. Early in 1933 South Africa finally
abandoned the gold standard. Although some local industries, notably
soap, furniture and stationery concerns, managed to hold on to their
customers, many others suffered keenly as their larger South African
competitors clawed their way back into the Colony's market. In the
first nine months of 1934 Southern Rhodesia imported more from
South Africa than in the whole of 1932.45 'Under existing conditions',
complained the Salisbury Chamber of Industries, 'Rhodesian
manufacturers are finding it extremely difficult and, in most cases,
quite impossible for them to compete with established industries
in the Union'. The Government, concluded the Chamber, should 'give
notice to terminate the Customs Agreement ... with a view to obtaining
an Agreement which will afford adequate protection to Rhodesia's
Secondary Industries, failing which arrangements /must7be immediately
made to control our own Customs'.46
Without support from other sectors of the economy, industry's
representations might well have gone unheeded even by so sympathetic
an administration as the newly elected Reform government.4' But
by the start of 1934 organised commerce and agriculture were far
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less enamoured of the existing customs agreement than they had
been two years previously. Ties between Rhodesian and South African
merchant houses, already somewhat attenuated because of Southern
Rhodesian attachment to Imperial Preference, were further loosened
during the gold standard crisis. Noting that local retailers were
'steadily increasing their direct importations from overseas, and are
relying less and less upon the Union except to satisfy urgent
requirements'48 the Associated Chambers of Commerce particularly
objected to the open stocks section of the Agreement which permitted
South African merchants to send imported materials to Southern
Rhodesia while only paying the low tariff applicable to South African
goods.49
Sentiment had also hardened in sections of the agricultural
industry. Those farmers not already angered by the 'unjust and
unreasonable1 decline in value of tobacco exports to the south from
c.£120 000 in 1930 to £74 000 in 1933,50 were infuriated by South
Africa's cynical manipulation of Foot and Mouth quarantine regulations
to exclude their produce from her markets. From the moment that
Foot and Mouth appeared in 1931 'the import of almost all pastoral
and agricultural products into the Union from Southern Rhodesia
was totally prohibited and the prohibition was extended to the transport
of any of the scheduled products through Union territory for export
overseas'. This total prohibition was probably justifiable at the time,
observed an official report,
but Southern Rhodesian opinion is that it should have
been modified as soon as the extent and severity of
the outbreak had been determined, and that the
continuance for a prolonged period of total prohibition
on the products of districts situated in some cases
hundreds of miles from any known centre of infection
was unreasonable... Even now, nearly four years after
the original outbreak of the disease, trade is seriously
hampered. For example, the Southern Rhodesian
Veterinary Department have scheduled huge, and in
their opinion ample areas round every centre in which
infection is known to exist, in which movement of cattle
is prohibited, but the Union Authorities have extended
the area from which import is prohibited to a distance
of 50 miles around the areas so scheduled. The Rhodesian
farming community have become convinced by the
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experience of the past four years that the Union
Authorities are using veterinary reasons as a cloak
for restricting import£s7 from Rhodesia in the interests
of the Union producer.^l
Satisfied that it had the backing not merely of a vociferous
handful of industrialists but also of most white farmers and merchants,
the Southern Rhodesian Government duly terminated its customs
agreement with South Africa. After several delays caused by
protracted political realignments in both countries, trade discussions
eventually began in Cape Town at the end of January 1935. Despite
their initial prominence, however, the interests of secondary industry
received scant consideration. Indeed, following the disintegration
of the Reform Party in the course of 1934 they were expressly
subordinated to mining and, to a lesser extent, agricultural concerns.
While the Rhodesia Chamber of Mines conceded that the customs
agreement should be amended to secure 'a more equitable arrangement
than at present exists', it bluntly warned against the 'creation of
tariff barriers ... las they7 would be extremely detrimental to the
Mining Industry ... /which/ obtains important supplies from the Union
... /Tariffs? would tend to increase landed prices and result in increased
costs of production'.52 And as the moment of renegotiation drew
near, spokesmen for the agricultural industry sounded an increasingly
conciliatory note. 'Our agricultural industry depends to a very great
extent, anyway at the present time, on the Union markets', cautioned
the Minister of Agriculture. 'However we look at a new Customs
agreement ... it is of first importance that our agricultural export
be continued. If by any new agreement we lose these markets,, it
would have a very bad effect on the agricultural iandustry of this
country generally1.5-^
Led by Huggins himself, the Southern Rhodesian delegation
pressed hard for the best market for their primary products. Ideally,
'the Union /should7 ... give Rhodesia an unrestricted market for tobacco
and cattle, thus re-establishing the principle of free trade between
the two Territories1.^ The South African response was nasty, brutish
and short. Not only was there no question of the market being expanded
but existing concessions were to be withdrawn. The tobacco quota
was revised downwards and the cattle trade, already subject to a
weight embargo, was restricted to a maximum of 5 200 head per
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annum. Exports to South Africa of Southern Rhodesian wheat, flour,
meal and bran, maize and maize products, eggs, butter, cheese,
potatoes, groundnuts and vegetable oils were banned except by special
permits issued from boards of control." Nor were the Southern
Rhodesians given much leeway in the matter of imports. South Africa
unblushingly bludgeoned her smaller neighbour into accepting the
freest possible entry of_ her own products. Although these became
liable for customs duty for the first time, they were to be admitted
into Southern Rhodesia 'at the rates of duty applicable to similar
products of the United Kingdom subject in general to a further 20%
preferential rebate1.^
'We ... /were/ not in a position to quarrel with the Union
authorities ... /as_7 it was ... essential to maintain to the fullest extent
the goodwill of the Government of the Union and the Union people
in regard to ourselves', explained the Minister of Finance."
Economically and geographically, South Africa was 'very powerful
in its relationship to Southern Rhodesia ... and ... could ... put the
screw on us in more ways than those in which we could retaliate even
in spite of the fact that we buy from them substantially more than
they buy from us'.58
 F o r e x a m p i e the profitability of Southern
Rhodesia's overseas exports partly depended on. special low freight
rates charged by South African Railways. There were other
considerations too: 'the Union provide us without charge with a Court
of Appeal - their Universities, which are heavily subsidised by the
Government, are open to our students ... our Civil Servants enjoy
concession privileges on the Union Railways, and in other matters
the Union Government has generally been ready to assist us in case
of need'.^ These constraints obliged Southern Rhodesia to be 'more
liberal than if it were an ordinary trade agreement between two
countries far distant from each ^O
IV
For Southern Rhodesia's hardpressed domestic bourgeoisie
it seemed that the only way of loosening South Africa's grip on the
economy was to make the most of their new freedom to collect customs
duty. If South African purchases of Rhodesian beef and cattle
continued to fall, then Southern Rhodesia would have to look to other
markets to. take a growing proportion of her exports. Preferential
trading arrangements along the lines of those established at the Ottawa
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Conference on Empire trade in 1932 held the most promise of improving
Southern Rhodesia's international bargaining position.61 The Customs
and Excise Tariff Act of 1937 accordingly inaugurated a three-column
tariff, ranging from the most favourable one applied to Britain,
Southern Rhodesia's best customer, through an intermediate category
to least favoured status. As the whole point of the Act was to enhance
Southern Rhodesia's capacity to define and provide an internal market
in return for overseas acceptance of her exports, local secondary
industries received no protection beyond the standard duties and
rebates levied on imports.6^
Although this protection was little enough, it was nonetheless
greater than anything which had previously applied to manufactured
imports from South Africa. Southern Rhodesian industrialists
consequently exploited opportunities created on the margin of Imperial
Preference. They were soon joined by others. Worried South African
factory owners calculated that where the increased price of their
products 'due to the new duties' was 'equal, or nearly equal, to that
of similar United Kingdom products, preference is almost sure to
be given to the latter ... /^because of7 the well-known sentimental
partiality which Rhodesians have for British products'.6^ Several
solved the problem by setting up branch factories beyond the Limpopo.
The combined result was a marked upsurge in industrial expansion.
Whereas only one new factory opened its gates in Bulawayo in 1936,
eight did so in the two years that followed.64
*
Over the same period the state's attitude towards secondary
industry became decidedly less antipathetic. In the first place, the
close ties between the Huggins administration and domestic agricultural
and mining capital imparted a certain ambiguity to its relationship
with imperialism. On the one hand they inclined the Government
towards Free Trade in general and Imperial Preference in particular
in order to keep costs of production down and export markets open.
On the other they involved the state in a series of tactical interventions
which favoured domestic interests over those of international capital ."
At a time when the impact of the Great Depression had thrown doubt
on the wisdom of relying exclusively on primary products, this
ambiguity intersected nicely with the interests of secondary industry
at the point of state support for those industries which processed
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raw materials. 'If we look at the development of secondary industries
in the Union today', said the Minister of Finance and Commerce,
'we see that not only do they, in many instances, supply the
requirements of the Union itself, but that they have developed to
such an extent that the raw material is now going overseas in a much
more condensed form ... giving a much greater return to the producer
... And that is what we.have to aim at in Rhodesia'.66
The second reason for the Government's altered stance was
the looming threat of war in Europe. As the international climate
worsened, former assumptions of comparative advantage could no
longer be taken for granted. Whereas the state had previously stolidly
declined to have anything to do with the backers of the Rhodesian
Iron and Steel Corporation,6? it quickly reversed course after the
Sudeten crisis of September 1938. Faced with the prospect of the
steel works' closure because of sales of large quantities of scrap metal
to Northern Rhodesia and South Africa by independent dealers, the
Government prohibited all such traffic in order to safeguard the
factory's supply of raw material. This action was necessary, the
Legislative Assembly was told, because the export of scrap iron and
- steel 'might eventually ... be against the interests of this country
... in the case of war. Besides the importance of the local industry,
it might be impossible for us to import steel products except under
great difficulties, and therefore a supply of scrap iron in this country
might assist the industry in meeting the needs of the primary
industries'.68
But beyond this point the state refused to go. None of the
shifts in official thinking about secondary industry involved a
fundamental re-evaluation of its relationship to the state or other
sectors of the economy. Although the Government was happy enough
to associate itself with secondary industry's successes, its practical
support was restricted to ad hoc measures of the kind applied to the
iron and steel industry. Thus in July 1939, not long after the Minister
of Finance had congratulated the Colony's factories on producing
goods worth some £4 million during 1938, a committee of enquiry
from which the Government had pointedly excluded industrialists,
firmly advised against an active policy encouraging secondary
industrialisation. Private enterprise, concluded the committee, 'could
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safely be left, without direct Government assistance, to develop
worthwhile industries as opportunity occurred, and that it was
unnecessary, if not undesirable, for the Government to devote funds
to hastening such development'.69 And despite the fact that Southern
Rhodesia had no textile industry and practically no capital goods
sector, the state agreed 'with at least 95 percent of ... /the
committee's/ findings'.70
As an economy peripheral to the South African one, itself
'peripheral to the main centres of capital accumulation',71 Southern
Rhodesia in the 1920s exported a limited range of primary products
and imported virtually all the manufactured articles which it needed.
The Southern Rhodesian Government was reluctant to do anything
which might add to the production costs of mining and agriculture.
But once South Africa embarked on a policy of industrialisation behind
tariff barriers which also excluded the greater part of her neighbours'
primary exports, Southern Rhodesia was obliged to take defensive
action. Initially, her defense did not encompass local industrialisation;
rather it involved the definition of a domestic market for imports
of manufactured goods from those overseas countries, primarily Britain,
who in turn provided a market for Southern Rhodesian primary exports.
This process, however, resulted in some protection for local industries
against their South African rivals. Southern Rhodesian industry grew
in the narrow space between regional sub-imperialism and imperialism
on a world scale. It was this space which local industrialists
successfully expanded in subsequent years, especially once international
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